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Abstract
In the mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of all
agents’ types. Traditionally, the designer may be in a dilemma in the sense that even
if she is not satisfied with some outcome with low profit, she has to announce it
because she must obey the mechanism designed by herself. In this paper, we investi-
gate a case where the designer can induce each agent to adjust his type in a one-shot
mechanism. We propose that for a profitable Bayesian implementable social choice
function, the designer may escape from the above-mentioned dilemma by spending
the optimal adjustment cost and obtain a higher profit. Finally, we construct an
example to show that the designer can breakthrough the limit of expected profit
which she can obtain at most in the traditional optimal auction model.
Key words: Mechanism design; Optimal auction; Bayesian Nash implementation.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1,2,3], there are one designer
and some agents. 1 The designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of
agents’ types. However, agents’ types are modelled as their private properties
and unknown to the designer. In order to implement the social choice function,
the designer constructs a mechanism which specifies each agent’s strategy set
(i.e., the allowed actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i.e., a rule
for how agents’ actions get turned into a social choice).
∗ Corresponding author.
Email address: 18621753457@163.com (Haoyang Wu).
1 The designer is denoted as “She”, and the agent is denoted as “He”.
Traditionally, in a standard mechanism agents interact only once (i.e., in one-
shot settings), and the designer has no way to adjust agents’ types. Hence,
the designer may be in a dilemma in the sense that even if some profile of
agents’ strategies leads to an outcome with low profit, she has to announce it
because she must obey the mechanism designed by herself. The designer may
improve her situation by constructing a multi-period mechanism, or holding a
charity auction [4]. Engers and McManus [4] proposed that agents’ bids in a
first-price charity auction are greater than those in a standard (non-charity)
auction [5] because of the charitable benefit that winners receive from their
own payments. Besides the multi-period mechanism and the charity auction,
there may exist another way for the designer to escape from the dilemma.
For example, suppose the designer is an auctioneer who wants to sell a good
in a hotel, and each agent is a bidder whose initial valuation to the good (i.e.,
private type) is low. The gorgeousness of the hotel is an open signal to all
agents that induces each agent to adjust his valuation to the good before he
submits his bid to the designer. Without loss of generality, we assume that each
agent’s valuation and bid both increase concavely with the hotel rent spent
by the designer, and the designer’s utility is a linear function of the winner
agent’s bid. From the viewpoint of the designer, as long as her marginal utility
is greater than her marginal rent cost, it is worthwhile for her to continue
investing on the rent cost. Obviously, the designer will obtain the maximum
profit when her marginal utility is equal to her marginal cost. Thus, if agents’
types (i.e., valuations to the good) are adjustable and influenced by the rent
cost of the hotel, the designer may get an outcome better than what would
happened without doing so, and actively escape from the above-mentioned
dilemma.
In this paper, we focus on the one-shot mechanism settings and investigate a
case where the designer can induce each agent to adjust his type. In Section 2,
we define notions such as adjusted types, optimal adjustment cost, profitable
Bayesian implementability and so on. The main result is Proposition 2, i.e., for
a profitable Bayesian implementable social choice function, the designer may
escape from the above-mentioned dilemma by spending the optimal adjust-
ment cost and obtain a higher profit. In Section 3, we construct an example
to show that the designer can breakthrough the limit of expected profit which
she can obtain at most in the traditional optimal auction model. Section 4
makes conclusions.
2 Theoretical analysis
Following Section 23.B of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green’s textbook [1],
we consider a one-shot setting with one designer and I agents, indexed by
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i = 1, · · · , I. Let X be a set of possible alternatives.
Assumption 1: Each agent i is assumed to observe a private parameter (i.e.,
type θi) which determines his preference over alternatives in X . Let Θi be the
set of agent i’s all possible types. Let Θ = Θ1×· · ·×ΘI , θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ Θ.
Definition 1: For any x ∈ X , each agent i’s utility is denoted as ui(x, θi) ∈ R,
where θi ∈ Θi, and the designer’s utility is denoted as ud(x) ∈ R.
According to Ref [1], a social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ→ X
that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types θ ∈ Θ, assigns a collective
choice f(θ) ∈ X . A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1, · · · , SI , and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X .
A strategy of each agent i in Γ is a function si(·) : Θi → Si. Let s(·) =
(s1(·), · · · , sI(·)).
Assumption 2: Assume that in a mechanism, each agent i can play his strategy
si without any cost. Hence agent i’s profit with respect to an outcome x is
just his utility ui(x, θi).
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Assumption 3: Assume that in a mechanism, the designer constructs an out-
come function and announces a cost c ≥ 0 which she will spend to perform
the outcome function. The cost c is observable to all agents and acts as an
open signal. The outcome function is denoted as gc(·) : S1 × · · · × SI → X ,
and the mechanism is denoted as Γc = (S1, · · · , SI , gc(·)). After learning the
cost c, each agent i is assumed to adjust his private type from the initial value
θ0i ∈ Θi to a new value θci ∈ Θi, 3 and then plays strategy si(θci ). At last, the
designer announces gc(s1(θ
c
1), · · · , sI(θcI)) as the outcome. The cost c is also
denoted as adjustment cost. Thus, although the designer does not know each
agent’s private type exactly, she can induce each agent to adjust his type in a
one-shot mechanism.
Definition 2: Given each agent i’s initial type θ0i ∈ Θi, for any adjustment
cost c ≥ 0, each agent i’s preference over the alternatives in X is determined
2 For example, suppose that each agent is a bidder in an auction, then each agent
can be considered to submit his bid to the auctioneer without any cost.
3 In Ref [5] (Page 60, Line 12), Myerson proposed that “if there are quality uncer-
tainties, then bidder i might tend to revise his valuation of the object after learning
about other bidders’ value estimates.” Similarly, here it is reasonable to assume
that each agent i can adjust his private type after observing the cost signal sent
by the designer. Section 3 gives an example, where the designer spends some cost
to rent a hotel to hold an auction. The gorgeousness of the hotel is just the signal
that the designer sends to agents in order to show how precious the sold good is,
although the designer may sell a poor good but deliberately rent a luxurious hotel
to deceive agents. After observing the signal, each agent adjusts his private type
(i.e., valuation to the good).
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by his adjusted type θci ∈ Θi by Assumption 3. For each agent i = 1, · · · , I, let
θ0 = (θ01, · · · , θ0I ) ∈ Θ,
θ0−i = (θ
0
1, · · · , θ0i−1, θ0i+1, · · · , θ0I ),
θc = (θc1, · · · , θcI) ∈ Θ,
θc−i = (θ
c
1, · · · , θci−1, θci+1, · · · , θcI).
A type adjustment function is denoted as µ(θ, c) : Θ × R+ → Θ, in which
µ(θ, 0) = θ for any θ ∈ Θ, i.e. zero adjustment cost means no type adjustment.
Let θc = µ(θ0, c). Let φ0(θ0) = (φ01(θ
0
1), · · · , φ0I(θ0I )) be the probability density
function of initial type profile θ0 ∈ Θ, and φc(θc) = (φc1(θc1), · · · , φcI(θcI)) be
the probability density function of adjusted type profile θc ∈ Θ. For each
i = 1, · · · , I, let
φ0−i(θ
0
−i) = (φ
0
1(θ
0
1), · · · , φ0i−1(θ0i−1), φ0i+1(θ0i+1), · · · , φ0I(θ0I )),
φc−i(θ
c
−i) = (φ
c
1(θ
c
1), · · · , φci−1(θci−1), φci+1(θci+1), · · · , φcI(θcI)).
Assumption 4: For any θ ∈ Θ and adjustment cost c ≥ 0, the designer is
assumed to know the type adjustment function µ(θ, c), the initial type distri-
bution φ0(·) and the adjusted type distribution φc(·). 4
Definition 3: Given an SCF f and φ0(·), for any adjustment cost c ≥ 0, the
designer’s expected utility is denoted as
u¯d(c) = Eθcud(f(θ
c)) =
∫
θc∈Θ
ud(f(θ
c))φc(θc)dθc,
and the designer’s initial expected utility is denoted as u¯d(0) = Eθ0ud(f(θ
0)).
Definition 4: Given an SCF f and φ0(·), for any adjustment cost c ≥ 0,
the designer’s expected profit is denoted as p¯d(c) = u¯d(c) − c, and her initial
expected profit is denoted as p¯d(0) = u¯d(0).
Assumption 5: u¯d(c) is assumed to be a concave function with respect to the
adjustment cost c, i.e.,
∂u¯d(c)
∂c
> 0,
∂2u¯d(c)
∂c2
< 0, for any c ≥ 0. 5
4 The initial type profile θ0 and the adjusted type profile θc are agents’ private
information by Assumption 1.
5 See the example given in Section 3. Suppose each agent i’s adjusted type is a
square root function of the designer’s cost as specified by Eq (5) and the social
choice function is specified by Eq (6), then the inequalities in Assumption 5 holds.
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Proposition 1: If there exists an adjustment cost c∗ ≥ 0 such that
∂u¯d(c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=c∗
= 1, i.e.
∂p¯d(c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=c∗
= 0,
then the designer’s expected profit p¯d(c) will reach its maximum at c = c
∗.
Let c∗ be denoted as the optimal adjustment cost. By Assumption 5, if c∗ ≥ 0,
there holds
∂u¯d(c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=0
≥ 1, i.e. ∂p¯d(c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=0
≥ 0.
According to Ref [1], the strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all agent i and all
θi ∈ Θi, sˆi ∈ Si,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(sˆi, s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi]. (1)
The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the social choice function
f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 5: Given an SCF f and φ0(·), f is profitable Bayesian imple-
mentable if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) The optimal adjustment cost c∗ > 0. 6
2) There exist a mechanism Γc
∗
= (S1, · · · , SI , gc∗(·)) that implements f in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, there exists a strategy profile s∗(·) =
(s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) such that:
(i) For all agent i and all θc
∗
i ∈ Θi,
Eθc∗
−i
[ui(g
c∗(s∗i (θ
c∗
i ), s
∗
−i(θ
c∗
−i)), θ
c∗
i )|θc
∗
i ] ≥ Eθc∗
−i
[ui(g
c∗(sˆi, s
∗
−i(θ
c∗
−i)), θ
c∗
i )|θc
∗
i ] (2)
for all sˆi ∈ Si. 7
(ii) gc
∗
(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition 2: Given an SCF f and φ0(·), if f is profitable Bayesian im-
plementable, then by spending the optimal adjustment cost, the designer can
obtain an expected profit larger than her initial expected profit.
Proof : Given that f is profitable Bayesian implementable, then the optimal
adjustment cost c∗ > 0. By Proposition 1, p¯d(c∗) is the maximum expected
profit. Therefore, p¯d(c
∗) > p¯d(0). ✷
6 Hence, the distribution of agents’ private types will be adjusted from φ0(·) to
φc
∗
(·) after each agent observes c∗.
7 Note that in formula (2), the probability density function of type profile θc
∗
−i =
(θc
∗
1 , · · · , θc
∗
i−1, θ
c∗
i+1, · · · , θc
∗
I ) is φ
c∗
−i(·). As a comparison, in the conventional notion of
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, there is no type adjustment, and the probability density
function of type profile θ−i = (θ1, · · · , θi−1, θi+1, · · · , θI) in formula (1) is φ0−i(·).
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According to Ref [1], a social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if s∗i (θi) = θi
for all θi ∈ Θi (i = 1, · · · , I) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct
mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)), in which Si = Θi, g = f . That is, if for all
i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi, θˆi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i[ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi]. (3)
Proposition 23.D.1 [1]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that im-
plements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Given an SCF f and φ0(·), if f is profitable Bayesian im-
plementable, then it cannot be inferred that f is truthfully implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, the revelation principle does not hold in
this case.
Proof : Given that f is profitable Bayesian implementable, then the optimal
adjustment cost c∗ > 0, and there exist a mechanism Γc
∗
= (S1, · · · , SI , gc∗(·))
that implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. According to Footnote 7,
formula (2) is related to the type distribution φc
∗
(·).
As a comparison, it can be seen from formula (3) that in the notion of Bayesian
incentive compatibility, there is no type adjustment in the direct mechanism.
Thus, formula (3) is related to the type distribution φ0(·).
Since θc
∗
= µ(θ0, c∗) and c∗ > 0, thus φ0(·) is not equal to φc∗(·). Obviously,
formula (3) cannot be inferred from formula (2). Therefore, given that f is
profitable Bayesian implementable, it cannot be inferred that f is truthfully
implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the revelation
principle for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not hold in this case. ✷
Proposition 4: If the designer’s expected utility u¯d(c) and expected profit
p¯d(c) satisfy the following condition,
∂u¯d(c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=0
< 1, i.e.
∂p¯d(c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=0
< 0, (4)
then the designer will obtain the maximum expected profit at c = 0. Put
differently, in this case the designer cannot obtain any more profit by spending
any cost to induce each agent to adjust his type.
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3 Example
3.1 Model Settings
Following the auction model in MWG’s book (Page 863, [1]), suppose that
there are one designer and two agents. Let the designer be an auctioneer who
wants to sell a good, and each agent be a bidder whose valuation to the good is
θi ≥ 0, i.e., Θi = R+. We consider a first-price-sealed-bid auction setting: Each
agent i is allowed to submit a sealed bid bi ≥ 0. The bids are then opened,
and the agent with the higher bid gets the good, and must pay money equal
to his bid to the auctioneer.
Suppose that:
1) Each agent i’s initial valuation (i.e., his initial type) θ0i is drawn indepen-
dently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The distribution is known by
the designer but the exact value of each θ0i is agent i’s private information.
2) The designer holds the auction in a hotel, and the cost for renting the hotel
is c ≥ 0, which is observable to two agents.
3) The gorgeousness of hotel is characterized by the rent cost c. Each agent
i adjusts his private valuation to the good after observing the gorgeousness
of the hotel. The larger the rent cost is, the greater each bidder’s private
valuation to the good will be.
4) Let β > 0 be a coefficient, each agent i’s valuation to the good (i.e., his
adjusted type θci ) is a square root function of the rent cost c,
θci = (1 + β
√
c)θ0i . (5)
Thus,
∂θci
∂c
=
βθ0i
2
√
c
,
∂2θci
∂c2
= −βθ
0
i
4
c−3/2.
That is, for any c ≥ 0, the following formulas hold:
∂θci
∂c
∣∣∣∣
c=0
= +∞, ∂θ
c
i
∂c
> 0,
∂2θci
∂c2
< 0.
Let θ = (θ1, θ2), consider the social choice function
f(θ) = (y1(θ), y2(θ), yd(θ), t1(θ), t2(θ), td(θ)), (6)
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in which
y1(θ) = 1, if θ1 ≥ θ2; = 0 if θ1 < θ2
y2(θ) = 1, if θ1 < θ2; = 0 if θ1 ≥ θ2
yd(θ) = 0, for all θ ∈ Θ
t1(θ) = −θ1y1(θ)/2
t2(θ) = −θ2y2(θ)/2
td(θ) = [θ1y1(θ) + θ2y2(θ)]/2.
The subscript d stands for the designer, and the subscript 1, 2 stands for the
agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. yi = 1 means that agent i = 1, 2 gets the
good. ti denotes agent i’s payment to the designer. td denotes the sum of two
agents’ payment to the designer. Obviously, for any c ≥ 0, y1(θc) = y1(θ0),
y2(θ
c) = y2(θ
0).
3.2 f is Bayesian Nash implementable
Now we investigate whether the social choice function f(θ) is Bayesian Nash
implementable. We will look for an equilibrium in which each agent i’s strategy
bi(·) takes the form bi(θci ) = αiθci = αi(1 + β
√
c)θ0i for αi ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose that agent 2’s strategy has this form, and consider agent 1’s problem.
For each possible θc1, agent 1 wants to solve the following problem:
max
b1≥0
(θc1 − b1)Prob(b2(θc2) ≤ b1).
Because agent 2’s highest possible bid is α2(1 + β
√
c) when θ02 = 1, it is
evident that agent 1’s bid b1 should never more than α2(1 + β
√
c). Note that
θ02 is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and b2(θ
c
2) = α2(1 + β
√
c)θ02 ≤ b1 if and
only if θ02 ≤ b1/[α2(1 + β
√
c)]. Thus,
Prob(b2(θ
c
2) ≤ b1) =
b1
α2(1 + β
√
c)
.
We can write agent 1’s problem as:
max
0≤b1≤α2(1+β
√
c)
(θc1 − b1)b1
α2(1 + β
√
c)
The solution to this problem is
b∗1(θ
c
1) =


θc1/2, if θ
0
1/2 ≤ α2
α2(1 + β
√
c), if θ01/2 > α2
.
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Similarly,
b∗2(θ
c
2) =


θc2/2, if θ
0
2/2 ≤ α1
α1(1 + β
√
c), if θ02/2 > α1
.
Let α1 = α2 = 1/2, we see that the strategies b
∗
i (θ
c
i ) = θ
c
i/2 for i = 1, 2
constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this mechanism. Thus, there is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this first-price-sealed-bid auction mechanism
that indirectly yields the outcomes specified by the social choice function f(θ),
and hence f(θ) is Bayesian Nash implementable.
3.3 The designer’s expected profit
Let us consider the designer’s expected profit:
p¯d(c) = (1 + β
√
c)E[θ01y1(θ
0) + θ02y2(θ
0)]/2− c.
The designer’s problem is to choose an optimal adjustment cost c ≥ 0 to
maximize her expected profit, i.e.,
max
c≥0
(1 + β
√
c)E[θ01y1(θ
0) + θ02y2(θ
0)]/2− c
By appendix, the designer’s initial expected profit is p¯d(0) = E[θ
0
1y1(θ
0) +
θ02y2(θ
0)]/2 = 1/3. Thus, the designer’s problem is reformulated as:
max
c≥0
(1 + β
√
c)/3− c
It can be easily derived that the optimal adjustment cost c∗ = β2/36. Hence,
by Definition 5 f(θ) is profitable Bayesian implementable. The maximum ex-
pected profit of the designer is:
p¯d(c
∗) = (1 + β
√
c∗)/3− c∗ = 1
3
(1 +
β2
12
).
Obviously, when β >
√
3, there exists p¯d(c
∗) > 5/12. Note that the designer’s
maximum expected profit in the traditional optimal auction with two bidders
is 5/12 (see Page 23, the ninth line from the bottom, Ref [6]). Therefore,
if β >
√
3, then by choosing the optimal adjustment cost c∗ = β2/36, the
designer can breakthough the limit of expected profit which she can obtain at
most in the traditional optimal auction model.
3.4 Each agent’s ex ante expected profit
Now we consider each agent’s ex ante expected profit when agents’ types
are adjustable and the designer chooses the optimal adjustment cost c∗. By
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appendix, the winner agent’s expected profit is denoted as follows:
E[θc
∗
winner − b∗winner(θc
∗
winner)] = E[θ
c∗
winner/2] = (1 + β
√
c∗)E[θ0winner]/2
= (1 + β
√
c∗)E[θ01y1(θ
0) + θ02y2(θ
0)]/2
=
1
3
(1 +
β2
6
).
And the loser agent’s expected profit is zero. Because the two agents are
symmetric, each of them has the same probability 1/2 to be the winner agent.
Therefore, each agent’s ex ante expected profit is 1/6 + β2/36.
As a comparison, we consider the ex ante expected profit of each agent in the
traditional optimal auction model. By Ref [6] (Page 22), the ex ante expected
payment of a bidder is
r(1− F (r))G(r) +
∫ ω
r
y(1− F (y))g(y)dy,
where r > 0 is the reserve price, [r, ω] is the interval of each agent i’s valua-
tion Xi, which is independently and identically distributed according to the
increasing distribution function F . Fix a bidder, G denotes the distribution
function of the highest valuation among the rest remaining bidders. For the
case of two agents with valuation range [r, 1] and uniform distribution,
F (r) = r, G(r) = r, ω = 1, F (y) = y, g(y) = 1, for any y ∈ [r, 1].
By Ref [6] (Page 23), given that each of two agent’s valuation to the good
is uniformly distributed on interval [0, 1], the optimal reserve price r∗ = 1/2.
Therefore, the ex ante expected payment of each agent in the traditional
optimal auction is
r∗(1− r∗)r∗ +
∫ 1
r∗
y(1− y)dy
=
1
8
+
∫ 1
1
2
y(1− y)dy = 5
24
.
Since the optimal reserve price is 1/2, each agent’s valuation to the good is
uniformly distributed on interval [1/2, 1]. Hence, each agent’s expected valua-
tion is the middle point of interval [1/2, 1], i.e., 3/4. Consequently, the ex ante
expected profit of each agent in the traditional optimal auction is his expected
valuation 3/4 minus his ex ante expected payment 5/24, i.e.,
3
4
− 5
24
=
13
24
. (7)
Recall that when agents’ types are adjustable and the designer chooses the
optimal adjustment cost c∗ = β2/36, each agent’s ex ante expected profit is
1/6 + β2/36. It can be seen that if β >
√
27/2, then 1/6 + β2/36 > 13/24.
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4 Conclusions
In the standard mechanism design theory, the mechanism works in a one-shot
manner. Each agent’s type is considered as private and endogenous value,
which means that the designer has no way to know and adjust each agent’s
type. Thus, although the designer constructs a mechanism in order to imple-
ment her favorite social choice function, she may behave like a passive observer
in a dilemma after receiving a profile of agents’ strategies: i.e., she must obey
the mechanism and announce the outcome specified by the outcome function,
even if she is not satisfied with the outcome.
In this paper, we investigate a case where the designer can induce each agent
to adjust his type just in a one-shot mechanism. The novelties of this paper
are as follows:
1) As shown in Proposition 2, for a profitable Bayesian implementable social
choice function, the designer may behave like an active modulator and escape
from the above-mentioned dilemma by spending the optimal adjustment cost
and obtain a higher profit.
2) As shown in Proposition 3, it cannot be inferred that a profitable Bayesian
implementable social choice function is truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. That is, the revelation principle does not hold in this case.
3) As shown in Section 3, the designer can breakthrough the limit of expected
profit which she can obtain at most in the traditional optimal auction model:
• If β > √3, then by choosing the optimal adjustment cost c∗ = β2/36, the
designer can obtain an expected profit larger than the maximum expected
profit 5/12 yielded by the traditional optimal auction.
• If β >
√
27/2, each agent’s ex ante expected profit is also larger than the
corresponding value 13/24 in the traditional optimal auction.
Appendix
As specified in Section 3, θ01 and θ
0
2 are drawn independently from the uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Let Z be a random variable Z = θ01y1(θ
0) + θ02y2(θ
0).
fθ0
1
(z) =


0, z < 0
1, z ∈ [0, 1]
0, z > 1
.
Fθ0
1
(z) = Prob{θ01 ≤ z} =


0, z < 0
z, z ∈ [0, 1]
1, z > 1
.
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FZ(z) = [Fθ0
1
(z)]2 =


0, z < 0
z2, z ∈ [0, 1]
1, z > 1
.
Therefore,
fZ(z) =


0, z < 0
2z, z ∈ [0, 1]
0, z > 1
.
As a result,
E(Z) =
∫ 1
0
z · 2zdz =
∫ 1
0
2z2dz = 2/3.
Therefore, E[θ01y1(θ
0) + θ02y2(θ
0)]/2 = 1/3. According to Eq (6), the de-
signer’s initial expected profit and utility are p¯d(0) = u¯d(0) = E[θ
0
1y1(θ
0) +
θ02y2(θ
0)]/2 = 1/3.
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